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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MERIEL M. HACKING, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
Case No. 16,821 
RULON C. HACKING, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
By this action, plain~iff-respondent, Meriel M. Hacking, 
(hereinafter, "respondent") sought and obtained a divorce from her 
husband, defendant-appellant, Rulon C. Hacking, {hereinafter, 
"appellant"). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On March 22, 1979 respondent was granted a partial decree of 
divorce from appellant, but the issues of permanent alimony and 
·Child support, together with the issue of ultimate property dis-
tribution, were ·reserved for subsequent trial. · Trial on these 
. ·issues was held on April 17, and August 16, 1979, and the lower 
court entered its amended judgment, based upon the evidence intro-
duced at trial, on October 10, 1979. The lower court awarded the 
bulk of the marital propert-y equally to the parties as tenants in 
common. Specifically, the lower court ordered that the ranch, 
title to most of which was in appellant and his mother's name, be 
awarded the parties equally as tenants in common, such ranch to be· 
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operated as a partnership and continued under the "immediate 
management and direction of the parties' son, Mitchell, in acco~ 
dance with usual business practices of an on-going cattle operat:' 
(Transcript, hereinafter "Tr.", at 148. The clerk below failed 11 
number the transcript as part of the record; therefore, referenCEI 
must be made to both the record (as partially numbered) and the 
transcript.) 
RELIEF SOUGH~ ON APPEAL 
Appellant see](s a reversal of the lower court's disposition :1 
of the parties' marital property and either: (1) remand of the 
case with instructions to the trial court to ·enter proper findin~:1 
of fact, conclusions of law and judgment, based upon the evidencE1 
adduced at trial; or, ( 2) pursuant to the equitable power of thi 1, 
Court to modify the lower court's findings and conclusions in. 
equitable actions, modification of the lower court's final dis-
tribution of the marital property to conform with the evidence 
adduced below and the applicable equitable. principles. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 1948, approximately four years before the parties to thi·
1 
action were married, appellant, Rulon c. Hacking entered into an
1 
agreement with his father, Rulon s. Hacking. (Tr. 29.) The 
agreement provided that if appellant would remain upon his fathe· 
ranch and help the latter operate and manage the same, the ranch 
would become appellant's upon his father's death. {Tr. 28-29.) 
In fact, for appellant's entire life, to and including the pre-
sent, he has lived on and worked the ranch, which included vario 
parcels of real property referred to below as the Diamond Moun~ 
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Wild Mountain, Coal Mine Basin and Allen Place properties, to-
gether with various state grazing leases, Bureau of Land Manage-
ment grazing permits, Dinosaur Park grazing permits and a 
membership interest in the Uintah Basin Grazing Association. 
(Tr. 33 4. ) 
In December of 1952, appellant and respondent, Meriel M. 
Hacking, were married. (Tr. 27.) Respondent was employed spora-
dically during the first few years of the partie.s' marriage, but 
no definitive eviden_ce was presented below with respect to the 
particulars of that employment, including length of tenure and 
remuneration. Respondent did, however, work in a "government 
office" for five years, beginning in 1962. (Tr. 215) No evidence 
was presented below with respect to the nature of such employment~ 
or respondent's compensation therefor. 
Appellant worked closely with his father in operating the 
ranch during the early years of the parties' marriage, while 
concurrently working for the McCullough Company. (Tr. 29.) 
Starting in 1965, appellant as~umed complete operation of the 
ranch, (Tr. 30.) which had expanded over the years as a result of 
various acquisitions of real property on the part of appellant 
and his father. ( Ex • :fl: 3 ; Tr • 3 3 4 . ) 
In 1968 appe~lant's father and mother conveyed to him by 
warranty deed, approximately one-half of the Diamond Mountain 
property, in partial fulfi~lment of their earlier agreement to 
convey to appellant th~ entire ranch conditioned upon his life-
long dedication to working and managing the same. (Ex. #4.) 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The parties' son, Mitchell, testified that appellant bore the 
primary responsibility for managing the ranch from 1965 until 
February of 1978, when Mitchell began managing the operation as a 
result of the parties' pending divorce and his mother's refusal t 
cooperate in its management. {Tr. 155-156; 190-192.) Mitchell 
Hacking willingly acknowledged that, although respondent and the 
Hacking children occasionally participated in ranch operations, 
and in this limited sense the ranch could be deemed a "family 
operation," nevertheless, the primary responsibility for making 
" 
specific decisions and operating the ranch as a whole, was borne 
exclusively by appellant. (Tr. 197-199.) 
Over the course of years of the parties' marriage, appellant 
managed the ranch and worked for McCullough for a period of six-
teen years. (Tr. 29.) In February of 1978 appellant began 
working for a company called "Dalgarno." Appellant's earnings 
from his employment with these companies were substantially in-
vested in the ranch. (Tr •. 34, 189, 332.) In 1964, appellant, 
together with a partner named Merkley, purchased and operated 
a fast-food franchise known as the A & W drive-in; the drive-
in was operated in downtown Vernal, Utah, for a period of six 
years exclusively by appellant's partner. (Tr. 33-34.} In 1970 
appellant purchased his partner's interest; and thereafter, Mrs. 
Hacking operated the drive-in. Although the business was sue-
cessful in earlier years, subsequent competition by other fast-
food franchises and d~preciation of the equipment and premises, 
coupled with the unwillingness of respondent to continue to 
·operate the business, all led the trial court to conclude that t 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
same should be sold and ·the proceeds equally divided. Appellant 
does not dispute the lower court's decision.in this regard. 
~ppellant conceded at trial that respondent should be awarded 
approximately one-half of the value of the parties' marital pro-
perty; to this~end, ·appellant proffered a proposed property dis-
fribution schedule which awarded respondent various items of 
marital property, approximately equal in value to those items 
which appellant proposed to retain. (Ex. #1) Appellant's pro-
posal provided that he should be awarded the ranch, and 
~ 
respondent would be awarded the balance of the parties' marital 
property, including valuable real property such as the Allen 
property and the real property on which the drive-in was 
constructed. 
It was appellant's position, however, that although res-
pondent was entitled to one-half of· the value of the marital· 
prope~ty, justice and equity required that appellant be awarded 
the ranch. To support appellant's position, substantial evidence 
was introduced to establish th~ following: (1) appellant had 
been raised from childhood, both living and working on his father's 
ranch, and had entered into an agreement with his father which was 
subsequently partially fulfilled when appellant received a con-
veyance of a substantial portion of ranch acreage (see above); 
(2) respondent, although an occasional participant in ranch 
operations, did not bear nor assume the principal responsibilities 
of managing and operating the ranch (see above); (3) because of 
the type of physical labor involved in ranch operations and 
management, and because of respondent's self-admitted heal th 
-5-
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problems, ~espondent presently is and will continue to be physi-
cally incapable of effectively and prosperously managing the 
ranch (Tr. 193, 265, 339.); ( 4) appellant will continue to be thE 
most capable, as between the two parties, of operating the ranch 
(Tr. 339.); and (5) finally, although condededly the Allen pro-
perty could be divided and separated from the rest of the ranch 
without egregiously interfering with orderly ranch operations, 
(Tr. 187) no other part of the "whole operation". couid be 
economicaily severed without rendering unprofitable the ranch 
as a whole. (Tr. 334.) 
Notwithstanding such substantial evidence, the trial court, 
contrary to Solomon's example, divided the child exactly in half 
and awarded the parties a tenancy in common interest in all ranct 
properties. ( R; 135-150.) Moreover, the trial court imposed 
an involuntary partnership on the partie~ with respect to the 
ranching operation, and the duty, upon a non-party to the divorce 
action·, Mitchell Hacking, to operate the ranch and resolve disput 
between appellant and respondent. 
No evidence was presented at trial to justify th~ impositior 
of an involuntary partnership upon the parties, nor to sanction 
the imposition of a duty upon Mitchell Hacking to referee the 
bitter disputes of the parties with respect to ranch management. 
Although Mitchell Hacking testified that in the abstract, ci 
separate identity and owne~ship of cattle could be maintained in 
.. 
the event the parties were to continue to operate the ranch to-
· gether after the divorce, {Tr. 186) nevertheless, no evidence 
was_ presented to suggest the parties would be able to continue~ 
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run the ranch together, even under Mitchell Backing's benevolent 
stewardship, under the facts and circumstances.of this case. To 
the contrary, Mitchell Backing's testimony is illuminating: 
Q. Would there be any problem of operating 
them [two separate cattle herds} together 
after they are separated and identified? 
A. The cows, you mean? 
Q. Yes. As a herd? 
A. No, not if I understand the question 
right. 
Q. Well, you would be able to continue 
to operate the herd, and you would be 
willing to operate both your mother's 
as well as your father's cattle, wouldn't 
you? 
A. Correct. If they could get along. 
(Tr. 186-187.) (Emphasis added.) 
If his parents could get along, Mitchell Hacking would be 
willing. to operate the ranch and the individual cattle enterprises 
of the parties. But he knew the parties could not get along, and 
he testified that disputes had arisen since he had taken command 
of the operation. (Tr. 192.) Unsure of himself arid his testi-
mony, and doubtless despondent with respect to his uncomfortable 
position in the cross-fire between his parents' bitterness, Mitchell 
Hacking testified near the end of his testimony: "I just don't 
know how they will feel about me·when this is over." (Tr. 198.) 
(The trial court's amended findings of fact, conclusions of 
law, and judgment are set forth ~n Appendix "A", infra.) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT'S IMPOSITION OF AN INVOLUNTARY PARTNERSHIP 
ON APPELLANT AND RESPONDENT WITH RESPECT TO OPERATION OF THE 
RANCH, CONSTITUTED A TOTAL ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
In DeRose y. DeRose, 19 Utah2d 77 426 P.2d 221 (1967), this 
Court observed: 
-7-
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[w]e remain cognizant of the pierogatives of the trial 
court and the latitude of discretion it is properly allowed 
in divorce cases. But this discretion is not without limit 
nor immune from correction on review, if that is warranted. 
Due to the seriousness of $UCh proceedings and the vital 
effect they have on people•s lives, it is also.the iespon-
sibility of this court to carefully survey what is done, 
and while. the determinations of the trial court are given 
deference and not disturbed lightly, changes should be 
made if that seems essential to the accomplishment of the 
desired objectives of the decree: that is, to make such 
an arrangement of the proper~y and economic reso~rces of 
the parties that they will have th~ best possible oppor-
tunity to reconstruc~ their lives on a happy and useful 
basis fo.r themselves an.a their children. An important 
considerat:io.·n in this rE~gard 1s the el1m1nat1on or mini-
mizing of poten~ial frictions or difficulties in the 
future. [Footnotes omitted.1 
Id., 426 P.2d at 222. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus, one of the most important objectives established 
by this Court to guide trial courts in property disposition in 
divorce proceedings, is to so dispose of the marital property so 
·as to enhance the opportunity on the part of the parties to reco1 
struct their lives on a happy and useful basis for themselves anc 
their children. Part and parcel of this objective is the·respo~ 
sibility of the trial court to.anticipate and eliminate or minim: 
potential frictions or difficulties in the future dealings of t~ 
parties. This position has been frequently reiterated by this 
Court. 
In Gramme v. Gramme, 587 P.2d 144 (Utah 1978), rehearing 
denied, Jan. 18, 1979, this Court observed: 
[t]he responsibility of the trial court is to endeavor 
to provide a just and, equitable adjustment of their 
[the parties to a divorce] economic resources so that 
the parties might reconstru6t their lives on a happy 
and usef.u~ basis. [Footnoted oini tted.] 
Id., at 148. (Emphasis added.) See also, Searle v. Searle, 522 
P.2d 697, 700 {Utah 1974). 
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In Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 871 (Utah 1979), this Court noted 
as follows: 
[~]hen a marr~age has failed, a court's duty is to con-
sider the various factors relating to the situation and 
to arrange the best allocation of the property and the 
economi~ res?urces of the parties.so that the parties 
and their children can pursue their lives in as happy . 
and use~ul man~er as poss~ble. If it appears that the 
decree is so discordant with an equitable allocation 
that it will more likely lead to further difficulties 
and distress than to serve the desired objective, then 
a reappraisal of the decree must be undertaken. In view 
of these principles, it is our view that the property 
award in this case is far too disparate and that the 
decree must b~ modified. 
Id., at 872. (Emphasis added.) 
Clearly, one of the primary objectives of which the trial 
court should never lose sight, is to provide for an equitable 
and just distribution of property in such a manner so as to 
facilitate the happy and successful reordering of the lives of 
the parties and their children and to minimize potential future 
friction, discord, and dispute. In the present case, the trial 
court's amended findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judg-
ment, reflect a total abandonment of these objecti_ves by. the lower 
court.in disposing of the parties' marital property. 
It is difficult to conceive of a situation, other than mar-
riage, wherein two individuals would be required to work more 
closely than in the context of a business partnership. It is 
fundamental hornbook law that general partners have broad powers 
to bind each other by their individual acts, and have a funda-
mental right to actively participate in the management and opera-
tion of the partnership. The implication from such broad powers 
_9_; 
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and rights is that partners must be able to continually cooperab 
and comprom,ise in the day-to-day operations qf the partnership. 
Conciliation, not confrontation, must be the partners fundamenta: 
creed. As noted above, no evidence was introduced in the lower 
court to suggest that these parties could continue to operate thi 
ranch on a partnership basis. To the contrary, substantial evi-
dence was introduced below with respect. to significant conflicts 
which developed during the joint operation of the ranch pending 
~ 
the· final divorce decree. Mitchell Hacking testified at trial 
that his father and mother had not been able to agree on such 
fundamental aspects of the ranching operation as the amount of 
money required to be borrowed from the Production Credit Associa· 
tion to finance annual expenses in the operation of the ranch. 
Finally, evidence was presented below, as noted above·, and was 
uncontradicted to the effect that the operation of the ranch wou: 
be rendered difficult, if not impossible, because of the parties' 
evident inability to compromise and work together. The trial 
court's decision:, therefore, to impose an involuntary. partnershiJ 
upon the parties with respect to the ranching operation, con-
stituted a total abuse of discretion. No evidence justified the 
decision, and substantial evidence to the contrary compels the 
conclusion that the partnership arrangement envisioned by the 
lower court would be fraught with friction and continual future 
discord. Under such sircumstances, the lower courts' decision t 
impose such a partnership should be reversed. 
Based upon this conclusion, this Court has two options. A~ 
recently noted in Read v. Read, 594 P. 2d 871 (Utah 1979): 
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[~}ecause th~ ca~e is equitab~e ~n nature, this court may· 
~ither exercise its own prerogative of making a modification 
in the decree, or remand for entry of a modified decree by 
the trial court. [Footnote omitted.} 
Id., at 8 7 3. 
In Read, a significant number of inconsistencies and am bi-
gui ties existed upon the face of the record before the Supreme· 
Court. Consequently, the Court was compelled, under those circum-
stances, to remand the case with instructions to the trial court 
~ 
to enter clear, concise, and consistent findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. In the present case, this Court is not faced 
with the overwhelming ambiguities and consistencies present in 
Re~d. The record is quite cl ear. This Court_, therefore, in the 
interest of judicial economy and expediency, should exercise its 
discretion to equitably modify the lower court's amended findings, 
conclusions, and judgment. Appellant's position is that an equitable 
modification of the decree, consistent with the evidence adduced 
below, should include modification of the lower court's order with 
respect to the imposition of an involuntary partnership upon the 
parties. Such involuntary partnership, together with the imposi-
tion of duties of management and dispute resolution upon a non-
party to the divorce action, Mitchell Hacking~ constituted an 
abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court, and, there-
fore, should be stricken. This court should then equitably divide 
the property between tpe parties, according to the evidence intro-
duced below. As noted above, such division would equitably in-
clude awarding appellant the ranch outright. 
-11-
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POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT'S FAILURE TO AWARD APPELLANT THE RANCH PRO-
PERTIES WAS INEQUTTAB~E AND UNJUST AND, THEREFORE, CONSTITUTED 
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
It is appellant's position that not only was the lower cour 
imposition of an involuntary partnership on the parties an abuse 
of discretion, but the lower court's ultimate division of the 
property into equal tenancy-in-common interest~ also constituted 
an abuse of discretion. 
t 
It is axiomatic· that the trial court is vested with broad 
discretion with respect to property settlement in divorce pro-
ceedings. As this Court has often stated: 
[t]he trial court, in a divorce action, has considerable 
latitude of discretion in adjusting financial and property 
interests. A party appealing therefrom has the purden 
to prove there was a misunderstanding or misapplication 
of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error; 
or the evidence clearly preponderated against the finding; 
or such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion. [Footnote omitted.] 
English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977). See also 
Kerr v. Kerr, 610 P.2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980); Mccrary v. McCrar 
599 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah 1979); Pope v. Poee, 589 P.2d 752, 753 
(Utah 1978); Naylor v. Naylor, 563 P.2d 184, 185 (Utah 1977); 
Pearson v. Pearson, 561 P.2d 1080, 1082 (Utah 1977·}; Baker v. 
Baker, 551 P. 2d 1263 (Utah 1976); Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 
491, 492-493 (Utah 1975); and Mi~chell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 
1359, 1360 (Utah 1974). 
Al though the trial court is vested with broad discretion w: 
respect to property distribution in a divorce proceeding, the 
guiding principles of justice and equity should control the 
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court's proper exercise of such discretion. Hamilt9n v. Hamilton, 
562 P. 2d 235, 237 (Utah 1977). Al though appellant· concedes· that 
the trial court is generally vested with broad discretion with 
·respect to property distribution and divorce proceedings, never-
theless, such discretion is not without limit, and cannot be· 
exercised, except when supported by substantial evidence at trial. 
In DeRose v. DeRose, 19 Utah2d 77, 426 P.2d 221 (1967} this Court 
stated, after acknowledging the generally broad discretion of the 
trial court to dispose of marital property: 
[b)ut this discretion is. not without limit, nor immune 
from correction on review, if that is warranted. Due 
to the seriousness of such proceedings and the vital 
effect they have on people's lives, it is also the 
responsibility of this court to carefully survey what 
is done, and while the determinations of the trial 
court are given deference and not disturbed lightly, 
changes should be made.if that seems essential to the 
accomplishment of the desired ob]ectives of the 
decree • • • • [Footnotes omitted.] 
Id., 426 P.2d at 222. (Emphasis added.) 
This Court recently outlined the burden which an appellant 
must bear to warrant reversal in this kind of :Proceeding:· 
[i)n ·these matters, a party seeking a reversal of the 
trial court must prove a misunderstanding or misappli-
cation of the law resulting in substantial and prejudical 
error, or ·that the evidence clearly preponderated aga~nst 
the findings, or that su6h a serious inequity resu~ted 
from the order as to constitute an abuse of the trial 
court's discretion. [Footnotes omitted.] 
Mccrary v. Mccrary, 599 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah 1979). (Emphasis 
added.) See also, Kerr v. Ke~r, 610 P. 2d 1380, 1382 (Utah 1980); 
and English v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 410 (Utah 1977). 
Mindful of the burden appellant, therefore, bears on this 
appeal, appellant reiter~tes his claim that the lower court 
abused its discretion in two particulars, according to the stan-
-13-
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dard announced in Mccrary: (1) the evidence clearly preponderate( 
against the lower court 1 s findings and conclusions with respect 
division of the marital property into equal tenancy-in-common 
interests; and (2) serious inequity would result were appellant 
not awarded the ranch, upon which he had lived and worked since 
childhood. 
The lower court specifically found, in Finding of Fact #9 
and concluded as a matter of law, in Conclusion of Law. #S(c), the: 
the real property o.f the parties, including the ranching operatic 
here in issue, should be awarded to the parties equally as tenant 
in common. The court did not recite specific. findings of fact 
which justified its general conclusion that the parties should 
share equally, as tenants in common, in the ranching operation. 
The lower court did not specifically find that the proposed dis-
tribution of the marital property proffered by appellant would bE 
inequitable or unjust. No other supporting findings or conclusic 
j~stified the trial court's Finding of Fact 19, and conclusion 
of law #5(c). (See R. 135-150, and Appendix A.) 
Substantial evidence was presented below to demonstrate 
appellant's long-standing affiliation with the ranch and it~ 
operation. Appellant had spent a significant portion of his lifi 
prior to his marriage, living on and working his father's ranch. 
Appellant had entered into an agreement from an early age with h 
father, respecting the ranch. The agreement provided that if 
appellant would remain" on the ranch and diligently work by his 
father's side, ultimately, appellant would own the entire opera-
tion. Appellant married respondent long after he had already 
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established hls int~ntion to r~mai6 on his father's ranch. After 
his marriage to respondent, appellant continued to.work and super-
vise operation~ on the ranch. Although respondent ocqasionally 
participated in ranch operations·, she did not assume the principal 
responsibility of managing and operating the same. 
Long before his father's death, appellant took over the 
principal responsibility of managing the ranch on a day to day 
basis. Appellant bore the burden of making the ranching operation 
profitable. The ranching operation involves the kind of physical 
labor appellant has exerted his entire life and respondent is 
incapable of accomplishing because of her health. Respondent's 
participation in the operation of the ranch has not been on the 
same level as appellant's, and respondent could not testify that 
she possessed the requisite experience to properly manage the 
ranching operation. Finally, the entire ranching operation should 
not be divided because of the integral nature. of each of its 
functional components. To do so, would render the entire. opera-
tion unprofitable. Thus, the ranch should be awarded exclusiyely · 
to one party, and it would be unsound and inequitable to award 
it to respondent. 
Because of appellant's long standing affiliation with and 
ownership of the ranching operation, because of his experience 
over the years in managing and operating the same, because respon-
dent is incapable of performing the labor required to successfully 
manage and operate th~ ranch, and because significant, unrefuted 
testimony was introd~ced that the ranching operation could not be 
profitably divided equally between the parties, the lower court 
abused its discretion in awarding the parties an equal tenancy in 
-15-
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common interest in the same. Substantial evidence wa.s introduce 
below with respect to an equitable distribution of.the property 
which would have allowed appellant to retain ownership and to 
continue to manage the ranching operations. Under these circ~~ 
stances, the trial court's findings and conclusions rise to the 
level of an abuse of discretion. This Court may, in its discre-
tion, modify the decree to conform with the evidence above recib 
and appellant respectfully requests the Court to so modify the 
decree. In the aleernative, the trial court's findings, conclu-
sions and judgment, with respect to disposition of the ranch 
property, should be reversed, and the case should be remanded to 
the lower court for entry of findings and conclusions consistent 
with the evidence originally adduced. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, because the trial court's 
order imposing an involuntary partnership upon the parties 
was a clear abuse of discretion, and because the lower court's 
award of the ranching operations to the parties equally as 
tenants in common constituted a further abuse of discretion, 
this Court should either modify the lower court's decree, con-
sistent with the evidence referred to above, or, in the alter-
native, should reverse the cause and remand for further proceedi 
in the lower court. 
,'~CKSON HOWAD;for: 
L/,1~WARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
120 East 300 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorneys for.Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
MAILED 2 copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Authur 
H. Nielsen, Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent, 410 Newhouse 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 this 23rd day of July, 1980. 
SECRETARY 
-17-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
A P P E N D I X II A " 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Arthur H. Nielsen 
Joseph L. Henriod 
EarL Jay Peck 
NIELSEN, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK 
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OCT 1O_1979 400 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 521-3350 
'dY _______ DEPUT'< 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 




FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
. RULON C. HACKING, Civil No. 9497 
Defendant. 
This matter came on regularly before the Court for hearing 
in Provo on the 22nd day of March in.Vernal, on the 17th day of 
April and continued hearing in Provo on the 16th day of August, 
1979. Arthur H. Nielsen appeared as attorney for the Plaintiff 
and Jackson B. Howard appeared as attorney for the Defendant. 
At the hearing on March 22, 1979, the Court granted Plaintiff 
a divorce and entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
a Decree. The trial of the issues with respect to final alimony, 
support money and an equitable distribution of the property and 
assets of the parties was held in Vernal on April 17, 1979, and 
in Provo on August 16, 1979. Following the presentation of 
evidence and after oral argument from the attorneys for the 
respective parties, the matter was taken under advisement by 
the Court on August 16, 1979. The Court now having reviewed 
and considered the evidence, being fully advised in the premises, 
hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Since their marriage in 1950, the parties have worked Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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together in acquiring various assets which have been developed 
as a family enterprise consisting of a drive-in restaurant 
located in the City of Vernal and a farm, ranch and livestock 
operation. 
2. Following the separation of the parties which led to 
the filing of these proceedings, the DefcncL:in t 11.:i.s en t~rcd in to 
and developed a business with pis son, known as the Ouray Brine 
Company. Although the evidence shows that the legal title to 
this business appears to belong to the son, Mitchell, an exchange 
of jobs between the Defendant and Mitchell appears to be for 
convenience and appearances only and does not reflect the true, 
equitable ownership of the business. 
3. However, in view of the fact that this business was 
developed at a time when the parties were estranged, the Court 
finds that any value in such business should be awarded separately 
to the Defendant. 
4. The Court finds that each party is entitled to have and 
retain the personal items and effects now in his or her possession. 
The Court further finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to have 
and retain the household items, including utensils, cooking ware, 
silver, linens and all furnishings, furniture and appliances in 
the home, and the 1976 Ford LTD automobile now in her possession; 
and the Defendant is entitled to have and retain the 1978 Pontiac 
automobile now in his possession, each subject to any outstanding 
debt, lien or obligation owing thereon. 
5. It appearing from the evidence that the GMC truck 
recently purchased by the Defendant has been and is used as a 
part of the Ouray Brine Company operation, the Court finds that 
said vehicle should not be included in a division of the assets 
of the parties; provided, however, that the funds used from the 
sale of livestock of the ranching operation or any other funds 
from the joint assets of the parties used toward the purchase 
-~ ~~~A ••nh~rlQ ~h~ll be accoun~ed for and returned to such 
- ""'-'--" · the Defendant. 
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6. Except as herein otherwise specifically provided, each 
party is entitled to an equal share in all of the assets acquired 
by the parties during the marriage. 
7. With respect to the drive-in restaurant business located 
in Vernal (appraised by Mr. Gerber at $173,180.00), it appears 
that Defendant is not interested in its operation and therefore 
the Court directs that the same be sold to such buyer as the 
parties may agree. In the event a sale has not been effected 
by the parties within 60 days from the date of the entry of the 
Court's Judgment herein, then either party may seek partition 
as provided by law. Pending such sale or partition, Plaintiff 
may -remain in possession of the drive-in and operate the same, 
receiving and retaining all income derived therefrom; provided, 
she shall pay all expenses of operation, other than real property 
taxes. 
8. With respect to the Maeser residente (appraised by Mr. 
Gerber for the sum of $44,000.00), Defendant is given the option 
to buy said property by paying to the Plaintiff the sum of 
$22,000.00 within 30 days from the date of the entry of Judgment 
herein. If Defendant fails to exercise said option, then said 
property shall be sold as in the case of the drive-in restaurant 
and the proceeds thereof divided equally between the parties. 
Pending such ~cquisition or sale, Plaintiff may, if she desires, 
continue to reside in the home and have the exclusive possession 
thereof, subject to the payment by her of monthly utility bills. 
9. All of the rest of the real property of the parties, 
including grazing permits, and all livestock and farm and ranch 
machinery, including the 1976 Ford truck, and other personal 
property comprising the farm and livestock operation are hereby 
awarded to the parti'es equally as tenants in common. The Court 
further directs that the farm and livestock operation be continued 
under the immediate management and direction of the parties' son, 
Mitchell, in accordance with usual business practices of an Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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on-going cattle operation. Any management decisions such as 
borrowing money or purchasing arid selling livestock or equipment 
shall be decided by the joint vote of the parties hereto; provided, 
however, that in the event of a dispute between the parties, their 
son, Mitchell, shall have a vote; and a majority vote will be 
required for any decisions not agreed to by both I'laintif f .:.rnd 
Defendant. 
10. The property referred to in the preceding paragraph 
includes, but is not limited to, the one-half interest of the 
parties in the real property located on Diamond Mountain, the 
Wild Mountain property, the Allen· property in Maeser, the Coal 
Mine Basin property, the lease from the State of Utah, all BLM 
permits, Dinosaur Park permits and the interest in the Uintah 
Basin Grazing Association as described in Schedule A attached 
to these Findings and by reference incorporated herein. 
11. The parties are and shall ·be liable for (and the 
properties described in the preced{ng paragraph are subject to) 
the outstanding liens, mortgages and operating debts and 
obligations incurred mutually by both parties. 
12. Unless otherwise agreed to by both parties, the practice 
of growing feed on the farm to be used in the operation of the 
cattle shall continue and such feed shall not be separately sold. 
13. In the event it becomes impracticable to proceed with 
a joint operation of the ranch as hereinabove set forth and the 
parties are unable to work out between themselves a partition 
of the property hereinabove described and awarded to them as 
tenants in common, then either or both may petition the Court 
for a division of such property in accordance with the procedures 
for partition outlined in Chapter 39 of the Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. 
14. Each party is awarded an undivided one-half interest 
in the stock of the Intermediate·Credit Bank and the stock of 
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15. The Court also finds that the Plaintiff is entitled to 
and Defendant should continue to pay to the Plaintiff in 
accordance with the Temporary Order heretofore entered herein 
the sum of $500.00 per month alimony and support money to and 
including the month of ~16 fl/\ , 1981).~aid award is a 
continuation of the award of temporary alimony and support money 
heretofore entered herein and is payable the 1st day of each 
month. Except for such continuing alimony and support money, 
said Temporary Order is hereby superseded and vacated. 
16. The Court further finds that the minor child of the 
parties, Sonya, is suffering from chronic sugar diabetes and in 
need of constant and continuing medical care, treatment and 
attention, as well as personal attention and supervision by the 
Plaintiff. In view of such circumstances, the Court finds that 
Defendant should continue to pay to Plaintiff as and for support 
money for said minor child the sum of $250.00 per month, payable 
on the 1st day of each month, until such child reaches the age 
of 21 years, unless otherwise ordered by this Court. 
17. The Court further finds that each party should pay his 
or her own costs and attorney fees and all debts and obligations 
·incurred separately by him or her since the separation of the 
parties. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court concludes 
as follows: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Except as herein otherwise specifically provided, all 
of the assets accumulated by the parties up to the time of their 
separation should be divided equally between them, subject only 
to the payment of the outstanding debts and obligations which the 
parties have mutually incurred. 
2. The Plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and separate 
property all of her personal effects, all household items, 
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furnishings and appliances, now in her possession and the 1976 
Ford LTD automobile, subject to· the payment of any outstanding 
indebtedness owing thereon. 
3. Defendant should be awarded as his sole and separate 
property his personal effects and possessions now in his 
possession and the 1978 Pontiac .J.utomobile no\v in his posscs:..;ion, 
subject to the payment of any outstanding indebtedness owing 
thereon. 
4. Defendant should further be awarded as his sole and 
separate property the interest which he has in the Ouray Drine 
Company, including the GMC truck which was purchased by Defendant; 
provided, however, that all -sums used for the purchase of said 
truck from the ranching operation, including proceeds from the 
sale of any livestock, shall be returned to the ranching operation, 
to be accounted for and divided equally between the parties. 
5. The Judgment should further provide that: 
(a) With respect to the drive-in restaurant business 
located in Vernal (appraised by Mr. Gerber at $173,180.00), the 
same be sold to such buyer as the parties may agree. In the 
event a sale has not been effected by the parties within 60 days 
from the date of the entry of the Court's Judgment herein, then 
either party may seek partition as provided by law. Fending 
such sale or partition, Plaintiff may remain in possession of 
the drive-in and operate the same, receiving and retaining all 
income derived therefrom; provided, she shall pay all expenses 
of operation, other than real property taxes. 
(b) With respect to the Maeser residence (appraised 
by Mr. Gerber for the sum of $44,000.00), Defendant be given the 
option to buy said property by paying to the Plaintiff the sum 
of $22,000.00 within 30 days from the date of the entry of 
Judgment herein. If Defendant fails to exercise said option, 
then said property shall be sold ·as in the case of the dri~e-in 
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partfes. Pending such acquis.l.tion or sale, Plaintiff may, if 
she desires, continue to reside· in the home and have the exclusive 
possession thereof, subject to the payment by her of monthly 
utility bills. 
(c) All of the rest of the real property of the parties, 
including grazing permits, and all livestock and farm and ranch 
machinery, including the 1976 Ford truck, and other personal 
property comprising the farm and livestock operation be awarded 
to the parties equally as tenants in common. The farm and 
livestock operation shall be continued under the immediate 
management and direction of the parties' son, Mitchell, in 
accordance with usual business practices of an on-going cattle 
operation. Any management decisions such as borrowing money or 
purchasing and selling livestock or equipment shall be decided 
by the joint vote of the parties hereto; provided, however, that 
in the event of a dispute between the parties, their son, Mitchell, 
shall have a vote; and a majority vote will be required for any 
decisions not agreed to by both Plaintiff and Defendant. 
(d) The property referred to in the preceding paragraph 
includes, but is not limited to, the one-half interest of the 
parties in the real property located on Diamond Mountain, the 
Wild Mountain property, the Allen property in Maeser, the Coal 
Mine Basin property, the lease from the State of Utah, all BLM 
permits, Dinosaur Park permits and the interest in the Uintah 
Basin Grazing Association as described in Schedule A attached 
to the Findings and by reference incorporated herein. 
(e) The parties are and shall be liable for (and the 
properties described in the preceding paragraph are subject to) 
the outstanding liens, mortgages and operating debts and 
obligations incurred mutually by both parties. 
(f) Unless otherwise agreed to by both parties, the 
practice of growing feed on the farm to be used in the operation 
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(g) In the event it becomes impracticable to proceed 
with a joint operation of the ranch as hereinabove set forth and 
the parties are unable to work out between themselves a partition 
of the property hereinabove described and awarded to them as 
tenants in common, then either or both may petition the Court 
for a division of such property in accordance with the procedures 
for partition outlined in Chapter 39 of the Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. 
6. Each party should be awarded one-half of the stock of 
the Intermediate Credit Bank and the stock of Hilo Bell and 
Dinah Bowl. 
7. Plaintiff should be awarded and Defendant should be 
required to continue to pay to the Plaintiff, in accordance with 
the Temporary Order heretofore entered herein, the sum of 
$500.00 per month alimony and support money to and including the 
month of /Jle, 0 AfH _R4, 198CI). This award is a continuation of the 
award of temporary alimony and support money heretofore entered 
herein and is payable the 1st day of each month. Except for 
such continuing alimony and support money, said Temporary Order 
should be superseded and vacated. 
8. Plaintiff should be awarded and Defendant should be 
required to continue to pay to Plaintiff, following the 
termination of alimony set forth in the preceding paragraph, as 
and for support money for said minor child the sum of $250.00 
per month, payable on the 1st day of each month, until such 
child reaches the age of 21 years, unless otherwise ordered by· 
this Court. 
9. Each party should pay his or her own costs and attorney 
fees and all debts and obligations incurred separately by him 
or her since the separation of the parties. 
DATED this /C>~ay of rr;;;;p~, 1979. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
SERVED the foregoing proposed Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, together with the proposed Amended Judgment 
to be entered thereon, by mailing a copy thereof, postage prepaid, 
to Jackson Howard, Howard, Lewis and Petersen, Attorneys for 
Defendant, at their office address, 120 East 300 North, Provo, 
Utah 84601, this day of ~ 19794 
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SCHEDULE A 
Diamond Mountain 
An undivided one-half (1/2) interest in the following 
described tracts of land in Uintah County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
TOWNSHIP 1 SOUTH, RANGE 23 EAST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN 
Section 2: South half of Southwest quarter. 
Section 3: South half of Southeast quarter. 
Section 10: Northeast quarter of Southwest quarter; North half 
of Southeast quarter; East half of Northwest 
quarter; Northeast quarter. 
Section 11: North half. 
··section 12: West half of Northwest quarter. 
TOWNSHIP 1 NORTH, RANGE 23 EAST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN 
Section 22: South half of the Southeast quarter. 
Section 23: Southeast quarter of Southeast quarter. 
Southwest quarter of Southwest quarter. 
Section 24: South half of South half. 
Section 25: North half of North half. 
Section 26: Northeast quarter of Northeast quarter. 
Lots 3 and 4; West half of the Northeast quarter; 
the Northwest quarter; the North half of the 
Southwest quartero 
Section 27: Lots 1, 2, and 3; Northeast quarter of the North-
east quarter; Northeast quarter of the Southwest 
quarter. 
Section 34: The North half of the Northeast quarter; also 
beginning at the.East quarter corner of said 
Section 34; thence North 68°30 1• west 2837.5 feet 
to the quarter Section line; thence North 280 
feet more or less to the Northwest corner of the 
Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of 
said Section 34; thence East 160 rods; thence 
South 80 rods to the point of beginning. 
Section 35: The North half of the Northwest quarter; South-
west quarter of the Northwest quarter; also 
beginning at the Northeast corner of the Southeast 
quarter of the Northwest quarter of said Section 
35 and running thence South 45° West 1866.7 feet 
to the Southwest corner of the Southeast quarter 
of the Northwest quarter of said Section 35; thence 
North 1320 feet; thence East 1320 feet to point 
of beginning. 
TOWNSHIP 1 NORTH, RANGE 24 EAST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN 
Section 19: Lots 3 and 4; East half of Southwest quarter; South-
west quarter of Northeast quarter. 
Section 30: Lot 1. 
together with all water rights, grazing rights, winter and summer 
graz.ing rights and improvements and appurtenances and rights of 
way thereunto belonging. 
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Coal Mine Basin 
The following described real property (surface rights 
only) located in Uintah County, State of Utah: 
Lot 10 and West 1/2 South West 1/4 of Section 2, Township 4 
South, Range 20 East of Salt Lake Meridian. 
Allen Property 
The following described property located in Uintah 
County, State of Utah: 
Beginning 53.5 rds. North of South East corner Section 18, 
Township 4 South, Range 21 East Salt Lake Meridian thence 
West 31 rds. North 61.5 rds. East 31.68 feet South 2752 rds. 
East 29.08 rds. South 33.98 rds. to beginning. 
Beginning 53.5 rds. North and 31 rds. West of South East 
corner Section 18, Township 4 South, Range 21 East of Salt 
Lake Meridian; thence West 16 rds. North 10°18' West 276.71 
feet; thence West 827 ft.; South 28°20' West 172.6 ft.; South 
48°05' West 363 ft. South 61°27' West 236.4 ft. thence 
North 87°38' West 429.6 ft. thence North 1233.4 ft. thence 
East 129 rds. South 61.5 rds. to beginning. 
Wild Mountain 
The following described real property located in 
Moffat County, State of Colorado: 
South 1/2 South East 1/4 Section 7; North West 1/4 North West 
1/4 Section 17 Township 7 North Range 103 West. 
State Grazing Lease 
Grazing lease on the following described lands located 
in Uintah County, State of Utah: 
SWl/4 Section 36, Township 3 South, Range 20 East; NEl/4 
NE1/4SE1/4 Section 16, Township 4 South, Range 20 East; Lot 
1 NE1/4NW1/4, Lots 3, 4 SE1/4SW1/4 Section 7, Township 4 
South, Range 21 East; Lots 3, 4; SW1/4NW1/4, Wl/4SW1/4 Sec-
tion 13; All Section 14; All Section 15; Wl/2, Nl/2NE1/4, 
Sl/2SE1/4 Section 23; Nl/2NW1/4, Wl/2NE1/4, SW1/4SW1/4, 
NW1/4SE1/4 I Section 24; Nl/2Nl/2' Sl/2NW1/4, SW1/2NE1/4, NW1/4SW1/4 
Section 26; All Section 27, All Section 22; NW1/4NE1/4, 
El/2NW1/4, Section 34, in Township 4 South, Range 20 East, 
Salt Lake Meridian. 
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Arthur H. Nielsen 
Joseph L. Henriod 
Earl Jay Peck 
NIELSE~, HENRIOD, GOTTFREDSON & PECK 
~ttorneys for Plaintiff 
FIU=i-, 
DiSTRIC"i C,~; · · -
' '"'lTAH CCL'":-1 ·1.:.... 
OCT 1 0 1979 
400 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 . ,,;1s Fi. <.;v,.m., \,;Li::n1\ 
• Telephone: 521-3350 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
MERIEL M. HACKING, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 




Civil No. 9497 
This matter came on regularly before the Court for hearing 
in Provo on the 22nd day of March in Vernal, on the 17th day of 
April and continued hearing in Provo on the 16th day of August, 
1979. Arthur H. Nielsen appeared as attorney for the Plaintiff 
and Jackson B. Howard appeared as attorney for the Defendant. 
At the hearing on March 22, 1979, the Court granted Plaintiff 
a divorce and entered findings of Fae~, Conclusions of Law and 
a Decree. The trial of the issues with respect to final alimony, 
support money and an equitable distribution of the property and 
assets of the parties was held in Vernal on April 17, 1979, and 
in Provo on August 16, 1979. Following the presentation of 
evidence ~nd after oral argument from the attorneys for the 
respective parties, the matter was taken under advisement by 
the Court on August 16, 1979. The Court now having reviewed 
and considered the evidence, being fully advised in the premises, 
and having made and entered further Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Except as herein otherwise specifically provided, all 
by the parties up to the time of their 
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separation be and they are hereby divided equally between 
Plaintiff and Defendant, subject only to the payment of the 
outstanding debts and obligations which the parties have mutually 
incurred in respect thereto. 
2. Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded as her sole and 
separate property all of her personal effects, u.11 household 
items, including utensils, cook ware, silver, linens, furniture, 
furnishings and appliances, now in her possession and the 1976 
Ford LTD automobile, subject to the payment of any outstanding 
indebtedness owing thereon. 
3. Defendant be and he is hereby awarded as his sole and 
separate property his personal effects and possessions now in 
his possession and the 1978 Pontiac automobile now in his 
possession, subject to the payment of any outstanding indebted-
ness owing thereon. 
4. Defendant is further awarded as his sole and separate 
property the interest which he has in the Ouray Brine Company, 
including the GMC truck which was purchased by Defendant; provided, 
however, that all sums used for the purchase of said truck from 
the ranching operation, including proceeds from the sale of any 
livestock, be returned to the ranchin~ operation, to be accoun~ed 
for and divided equally between the parties. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
5. With respect to the drive-in restaurant business located 
in Vernal (appraised by Mr. Gerber at $173,180.00), the same be 
sold to such buyer as the parties may agree. In the event a 
sale has not been effected by the parties within 60 days from 
the date of the entry of the Court's Judgment herein, then either 
party may seek partition as provided by law. Pending such sale 
or partition, Plaintiff may remain in possession of the drive-in 
and operate the same, receiving and retaining all income derived 
therefrom; provided, she shall pay all expenses of operation, 
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6. With respect to the Maeser residence (appraised by Mr. 
Gerber for the sum of $44,000.00), Defendant is hereby given the 
option to buy said property by paying to the Plaintiff the sum 
of $22,000.00 within 30 days from the date of the entry of Judgment 
herein. If Defendant fails to exercise said option, then said 
property shall be sold as in the case of the drive-in restuurant 
and the proceeds thereof divided equally between the parties. 
Pending such acquisition or sale, Plaintiff may, if she desires, 
continue to reside in the home and have the exclusive possession 
thereof, subject to the payment by her of monthly utility bills. 
7. All of the rest of the real property of the parties, 
including grazing permits, and all livestock and farm and ranch 
machinery, including the 1976 Ford truck, and other personal 
property comprising the farm and livestock operation be and they 
are hereby awarded to the parties equally as tenants in common. 
The farm and livestock operation shall be continued under the 
immediate management and direction of the parties' son, Mitchell, 
in accordance with usual business practices of an on-going cattle 
operation. Any management decisions such as borrowing money or 
purchasing and selling livestock or equipment shall be decided 
by the joint vote of the parties hereto; provided, however, that 
in the event of a dispute between the parties, their son, Mitchell, 
shall have a vote; and a majority vote will be required for any 
decisions not agreed to by both Plaintiff and Defendant. 
8. The property referred to in the preceding paragraph 
includes, but is not limited to, the one-half interest of the 
parties in the real property located on Diamond Mountain, the 
Wild Mountain property, the Allen property in Maeser, the Coal 
Mine Basin property, the lease from the State of Utah, all BLM 
permits, Dinosaur Park permits and the interest in the Uintah 
Basin Grazing Association as described in Schedule A attached 
hereto and by reference incorporated herein. 
9. The paities are and shall be liable for (and the 
he preceding paragraph are subject to) 
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the outstanding liens, mortgages and operating debts and 
obligations incurred mutually by both parties. 
10. Unless otherwise agreed to by both parties, the 
practice of growing feed on the farm to be used in the operation 
of the cattle shall continue and such feed shall not be separately 
sold. 
11. In the event it becomes impracticable to proceed with 
a joint operation of the ranch as hereinabove set forth and the 
parties are unable to work out between themselves a partition of 
the property hereinabove described and awarded to them as tenants 
in common, theri either or both may petition the Court for a 
division of such property in accordance with the procedures for 
partition outlined in Chapter 39 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
12. Each party is hereby awarded one-half of the stock of 
the Intermediate.Credit Bank and the stock of Hike Bell and Dinah 
Bowl. 
13. Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded and Defendant 
be and he is hereby required to continue to pay to the Plaintiff, 
in accordance with the Temporary Order heretofore entered herein, 
the sum of $500.00 per month alimony and ~rt money to and 
including the month of lg,<o-14,(AL" . .' 198D, This award is a 
continuation of the award of temporary alimony and support money 
heretofore entered herein and is payable the 1st day of each 
month. Except for such continuing alimony and support money, 
said Temporary Order is hereby superseded and vacated. 
14. Following the termination of alimony as set forth in 
the preceding paragraph, P.laintiff be and she is hereby awarded 
and Defendant be and he is hereby required to continue to pay to 
Plaintiff as and for support money for said minor child the sum 
of $250.00 per month, payable on the 1st day of each month, until 
such child reach~s the age of 21 years, unless otherwise ordered 
by this Court. 
15. Each party pay his or her own costs and attorneys fees 
_;~~..:.._:-gations incurred separately by him or her 
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since the separation of the parties. 
ef' 
DATED this .JQ_ day of @t!l};;po.A , 19 79. 
~'/F Laf-)trrsTRICT JUDGE 
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SCHEDULE A 
Diamond Mountain 
An undivided one-half {1/2) interest in the followin~ 
described tracts of land in Uintah County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
TOWNSHIP 1 SOUTH, RANGE 23 EAST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN 
Section 2: South half of Southwest quarter. 
Section 3: South half of Southeast quarter. 
Section 10: Northeast quarter of Southwest quarter; North half 
of Southeast quarter; East half of Northwest 
quarter; Northeast quarter. · 
Section 11: North half. 
Section 12: West half of Northwest quarter. 
TOWNSHIP 1 NORTH, RANGE 23 EAST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN 
Section 22: South half of the Southeast quarter. 
Section 23: Southeast quarter of Southeast quarter. 
Southwest quarter of Southwest quarter. 
Section 24: South half of South half. 
Section 25: North half of North half. 
Section 26: Northeast quarter of Northeast quarter. 
Lots 3 and 4; West half of the Northeast quarter; 
the Northwest quarter; the North half of the 
Southwest quarter. 
Section 27: Lots 1, 2, and 3; Northeast quarter of the North-
east quarter; Northeast quarter of the Southwest 
quarter. 
Section 34: The North half of the Northeast quarter; also 
beginning at the East quarter corner of said 
Section 34; thence North 68°30' West 2837.5 feet 
to the quarter Section line; thence North 280 
feet more or less to the Northwest corner of the 
Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter of 
said Section 34; thence East 160 rods; thence 
South 80 rods to the point of beginning. 
Section 35: The North half of the Northwest quarter; South-
west quarter of the Northwest quarter; also 
beginning at the Northeast corner of the Southeast 
quarter of the Northwest quarter of said Section 
35 and running thence South 45° West 1866.7 feet 
to the Southwest corner of the Southeast quarter 
of the Northwest quarter of said Section 35; thence 
North 1320 feet; thence East 1320 feet to point 
of beginning. 
TOWNSHIP 1 NORTH, RANGE 24 EAST, SALT LAKE MERIDIAN 
Section 19: Lots 3 and 4; East half of Southwest quarter; South-
west quarter of Northeast quarter. 
Section 30: Lot 1. 
together with all water rights, grazing rights, winter and summer 
grazing rights and improvements and appurtenances and rights of 
way thereunto belonging. 
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Coal Mine Basin 
The following described real property (surface rights 
only) located in Uintah County, State of Utah: 
Lot 10 and West 1/2 South West 1/4 of Section 2, Township 4 
South, Range 20 East of Salt Lake Meridian. 
Allen Property 
The following described property located in Uintah 
County, State of Utah: 
Beginning 53.5. rds. North of South East corner Section 18, 
Township 4 South, Range 21 East Salt Lake Meridian thence 
West 31 rds. North 61.5 rds. East 31.68 feet South 2752 rds. 
East 29.08 rds. South 33.98 rds. to beginning. 
Beginning 53.5 rds. North and 31 rds. West of South East 
corner Section 18, Township 4 South, Range 21 East of Salt 
Lake Meridian; thence West 16 rds. North 10°18' West 276.71 
feet; thence West 827 ft.; South 28°20' West 172.6 ft.; South 
48°05' West 363 ft. South 61°27' West 236.4 ft. thence 
North 87°38' West 429.6 ft. thence North 1233.4 ft. thence 
East 129 rds. South 61.5 rds. to beginning. 
Wild Mountain 
The following described real property located in 
Moffat County, State of Colorado: 
South 1/2 South East 1/4 Section 7; North West 1/4 North West 
1/4 Section 17 Township 7 North Range 103 West. 
State Grazing Lease 
Grazing lease on the following described lands located 
·in Uintah County, State of Utah: 
SWl/4 Section 36, Township 3 South, Range 20 East; NEl/4 
NEl/4SEl/4 Section 16, Township 4 South, Range 20 East; Lot 
1 NE1/4NW1/4, Lots 3, 4 SE1/4SW1/4 Section 7, Township 4 
South, Range 21 East; Lots 3, 4; SW1/4NW1/4, Wl/4SW1/4 Sec-
tion 13; All Section 14; All Section 15; Wl/2, Nl/2NE1/4, 
Sl/2SE1/4 Section 23; Nl/2NW1/4, Wl/2NE1/4, SWl/4SWl/4, 
NW1/4SE1/4, Section 24; Nl/2Nl/2, Sl/2NW1/4, SWl/2NEl/4, NW1/4SW1/4 
Section 26; All Section 27, All Section 22; NWl/4NEl/4, 
El/2NW1/4, Section 34, in Township 4 South, Range 20 East, 
Salt Lake Meridian. 
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